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University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR)  
The University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR) is an academic research 
institution dedicated to the study of public opinion in Iran and other countries. Since its inception, 
UTCPOR has been providing survey research and analysis services to a wide range of clients from the 
public, private, and nonprofit sectors. With state-of-the-art data collection facilities in Tehran and 
extensive fieldwork capabilities across Iran, UTCPOR possesses unique capabilities to conduct 
face-to-face, telephone, mail, and online surveys inside Iran on various issues of local, national, and 
international significance. UTCPOR is also extensively involved in codifying the best survey practices 
for pollsters and opinion research practitioners in Iran. 
  
The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) 
An interdisciplinary policy research center, CISSM builds the case for a fundamental transformation 
of international security policies by focusing on areas where current policies fail to adequately reduce 
risks, including: the management of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy; the local dynamics of civil 
conflict and post-conflict reconstruction; the effects of climate change on the risks of civil violence 
and nuclear instability; emerging challenges, such as cybersecurity and geoengineering; the moral 
dimensions of global security problems; the oversight of research with dangerous pathogens; and the 
use of space for security and for the public good. 
 
The Program for Public Consultation 
The Program for Public Consultation (PPC) seeks to improve democratic governance by helping 
governments consult their citizenry on the key public policy issues the government faces. Unlike 
standard polls, in public consultations respondents are presented information that helps simulate the 
issues and tradeoffs faced by policymakers. PPC has been established to develop the methods and 
theory of public consultation and to conduct public consultations. PPC is a joint program of the Center 
on Policy Attitudes and the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. 
 
IranPoll.com 
IranPoll.com is an independent full-service opinion research and consultancy company headquartered 
in Toronto, Canada, focusing exclusively on Iran. A subsidiary of People Analytics Inc., IranPoll.com 
relies on its vast survey capacity to conduct and collect polling data from Iran using various modes of 
data collection, including a national probability sample omnibus telephone (CATI) survey that it runs 
every month. Building on the in-depth local knowledge of its team of experts, IranPoll.com solely 
relies on methods that could be objectively verified and independently replicated. Complementing its 
extensive field capacity, IranPoll.com is the developer of VoxIran.com, which is to date the single 
most comprehensive databank of Iranian opinion polls containing more than 3,000 diverse questions 
on 280 topics and subtopics from 185 probability sample surveys conducted from 2006 to 2015 in 
Iran. Through its exclusive access to VoxIran, IranPoll.com provides its clients with evidence-based 
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As the marathon negotiation between Iran and the P5+1 countries (China, France, Germany, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) nears its third self-imposed deadline on 
June 30, many around the world wonder if this round of negotiations is going to resolve all 
remaining issues, and if so, whether the officials involved are going to be able to sell the deal 
they have worked out back in their own capitals. As to whether or not a deal will be reached, 
diplomats from Iran as well as the P5+1 countries have consistently been cautiously 
optimistic. While all sides indicate that they are committed to reaching a deal by the June 30 
deadline, recent reports suggest that gaps remain between concrete positions on the main 
elements of a deal.  
And as negotiators struggle with various elements of the deal outside their capitals, there is 
significant controversy inside the capitals on what would constitute a “good deal.” The U.S. 
Congress has passed legislation giving Congress at least a month to review the details of any 
agreement reached before President Obama could waive any congressionally imposed 
sanctions on Iran. Lawmakers and officials in Tehran have been pressing their case that any 
deal that would not result in speedy termination of sanctions or would open Iran’s sensitive 
non-nuclear military and security installations to Iran-specific inspections is unacceptable.  
To better understand the domestic political environments that constrain how much negotiating 
room the key players have, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland 
(CISSM) has conducted several studies of American and Iranian public opinion on the nuclear 
negotiations. Its first study of American public opinion, “Americans on Negotiations with 
Iran,” was conducted in collaboration with the Program for Public Consultation in July 2014, 
followed by another study which was released on March 3, 2015. Both of these reports are 
available at www.cissm.umd.edu.  
CISSM also conducted a study of Iranian public opinion on the nuclear negotiations in 
collaboration with the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR) 
in July 2014, focusing mostly on the steps Iran would be willing to take in return for removal 
of unilateral and multilateral sanctions, and published the results of that study on September 
17, 2014. The current study was conducted after Iran and the P5+1 reached an understanding 
regarding the main elements of the final deal in Lausanne, Switzerland. It seeks to illuminate 
the specific views and preferences of Iranian citizens regarding the ongoing nuclear 
negotiations, their support for a deal along the lines of the framework understanding, their 
assumptions regarding the elements of the final deal, and their expectations from a deal.  
This study also explores a broad range of Iranian political preferences and attitudes that shape 
the context in which the nuclear negotiations are occurring. 
 
How the Study Was Conducted 
Besides its timely topic and significance, this study is also unique in that its data has been 
collected by two independent survey research organizations; one located inside Iran and the 
other located outside Iran. As before, UTCPOR was used to conduct most of the interviews of 
this study, calling respondents from their centralized call-center located in Tehran. This time 
around, however, CISSM also hired IranPoll.com, an independent Toronto-based opinion 
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research firm, to conduct a portion of the study’s interviews by calling into Iran from Canada. 
CISSM then cross-validated the results obtained from these two independent survey 
organizations and confirmed inter-agency reliability on every variable.  
 
Response Verification 
Concerned with the possibility that respondents might have systematically held back their 
own true opinions and, instead, provided answers in line with positions articulated in Iranian 
state-owned news media, CISSM conducted an analysis to see what proportion of the sample 
systematically provided responses that were in line with the stated positions of the Iranian 
government. The analysis found that only 9% of the respondents provided answers that are 
systematically and fully in line with stated positions of the Iranian government, and 91% of 
the respondents provided at least one response that is directly at odds with positions 
articulated in Iranian state-owned news media. 
 
Methodology  
This study was designed, managed, and analyzed jointly by Center for International and 
Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and the University of Tehran Center for Public 
Opinion research (UTCPOR). For cross-validation purposes, CISSM also hired IranPoll.com, 
an independent Toronto-based polling company, to independently execute 15% of the survey 
calling into Iran from outside of Iran. The rest of the survey data was collected using 
UTCPOR’s call center in Tehran.  
 
UTCPOR conducted its interviews between May 12 and May 28, 2015, and IranPoll.com 
conducted its interviews between May 23 and May 28, 2015. The overall sample size is 
n=1009 (n=150 from Toronto and 859 from Tehran), and the sampling margin of error is 
about +/- 3.2%. 
 
The entire sample (n=1009) was stratified first by Iranian provinces and then in accordance to 
settlement size and type, using area codes and telephone exchanges for landline telephones in 
Iran. Then n=150 of the sample, which was randomly extracted from the overall sample, was 
given to IranPoll.com to execute and the remaining was given to UTCPOR. Random Digit 
Dialing (RDD) was used to reach random households. When a residence was reached, an 
adult was randomly selected from within that household using the random table technique. An 
initial attempt and three callbacks were made in an effort to complete an interview with the 
randomly selected respondents. All 31 Iranian provinces were represented in the completed 
sample in proportions similar to their actual populations, as were rural and urban areas. This 
interviewing protocol was employed both by the Iran- and the Canada-based call centers.   
 
The contact rate of UTCPOR, defined as the proportion of respondents who were reached and 
ultimately agreed to be interviewed relative to the number of respondents attempted, was 
74%. The completion rate was 86%. IranPoll.com’s contact rate was 69% and its completion 






All of the interviews were conducted using computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) in 
the two centralized call centers. All interviews were monitored in real-time by call center 
supervisors and have been recorded.  The population parameters of the survey match those 
of census data quite closely. The data collected by IranPoll.com and UTCPOR were 
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Summary of Findings 
 
1. Iran’s Nuclear Program (page 8) 
Overwhelming majorities of Iranians continue to say that it is very important for Iran to have 
a nuclear program. The nuclear program is seen as one of Iran’s greatest achievements. A 
large majority continues to see the program as driven purely by peaceful goals, though one in 
five see it as being an effort to pursue nuclear weapons. This support for Iran’s nuclear 
program appears to be driven by a combination of symbolic and economic considerations.  
However, while a majority sees the program as being an important way for Iran to stand up to 
the West, serving Iran’s future energy and medical needs is seen as more important.  
 
2. Views on Nuclear Weapons (page 10) 
A large and growing majority of Iranians express opposition to nuclear weapons in various 
ways. Two thirds now say that producing nuclear weapons is contrary to Islam. Eight in ten 
approve of the NPT goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and establishing a nuclear 
weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Consistent with these views, Iranians express 
opposition to chemical weapons, with nine in ten approving of Iran’s decision, during the 
Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, to not use chemical weapons in response to Iraq’s use of them.  
 
3. Iran - P5+1 Nuclear Deal (page 12) 
Given information about the nuclear deal being negotiated between Iran and the P5+1, a 
substantial majority favors it and only one in six oppose it. A quarter, though, are undecided 
or equivocal. Nearly three in four are optimistic that Iran and the P5+1 will arrive at a deal in 
regard to Iran’s nuclear program. Three in four think the Majlis (Iran’s Parliament) should 
have a say on a nuclear deal.  
 
4. The Potential Removal of Sanctions (page 16) 
The support for Iran pursuing a deal with the P5+1 appears to rest to some extent on the 
assumption—held by a large majority—that all sanctions on Iran would be lifted as part of the 
deal, and there is optimism that the sanctions would in fact be lifted. Approximately half of 
respondents say Iran should not agree to a deal unless the U.S. lifts all of its sanctions, while 
nearly as many say Iran should be ready to make a deal even if the U.S. retains some 
sanctions, provided all UN and EU sanctions are lifted. Among those who believe that all U.S. 
sanctions would be lifted, support for a deal is nearly two thirds, while among those who 
assume that the U.S. will retain some sanctions, support is a bare majority. The removal of 
UN sanctions is seen as more important than the removal of U.S. sanctions.  
 
5. Expectations About Positive Effects of a Deal (page 19) 
Iranians express high expectations that a nuclear deal would result in significant positive effects 
in the near term. Majorities say they would expect to see, within a year, better access to foreign 
medicines and medical equipment, significantly more foreign investment, and tangible 
improvement in living standards.  
6. The Sanctions and Iran’s Economy (page 21) 
The sanctions on Iran are overwhelmingly perceived as having a negative impact on the 




fairly sanguine and have been improving. Also, the impact of the sanctions is seen as limited 
and a lesser factor affecting the economy as compared to domestic mismanagement and 
corruption.  
 
7. Views of Rouhani (page 23) 
As Iran’s parliamentary elections near, Iran’s President Rouhani is clearly one of the strongest 
political figures in Iran. Half would prefer to see Rouhani supporters win in the February 2016 
parliamentary elections, while one quarter favors his critics. However, Rouhani supporters have 
high expectations that a deal removing all U.S. sanctions and bringing rapid economic change is 
going to take place. If a deal is reached that does not meet these expectations, Rouhani could be 
left politically vulnerable. 
 
In a hypothetical presidential match-up, Rouhani currently does better than former president 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by two to one. Large majorities say Rouhani has been at least 
somewhat successful in improving the economic situation, improving Iran’s relations with 
European countries, and reducing sanctions. Three in four Iranians say that if the negotiations 
were to fail to produce a final agreement, they would only or mostly blame the P5+1 countries.  
 
8. Relations with the U.S. (page 26) 
Views of the United States, especially the U.S. government, continue to be quite negative. 
Only four in ten believe that U.S. leaders genuinely believe that Iran is trying to acquire 
nuclear weapons. Asked why the U.S. is imposing sanctions on Iran, the most common 
answers portray the U.S. as seeking to confront and dominate Iran; very few mention 
concerns about nuclear weapons. However, a slight majority has a positive view of the 
American people. 
If Iran and the P5+1 reach a deal, a large majority believes that the U.S. will still impede other 
countries from cooperating with Iran, and a slight majority believes that Iran making 
concessions on the nuclear issue will likely lead the U.S. to seek more concessions. Just one 
in six believe that concessions would be likely to lead to greater accommodation; however, 
this number is higher than a year ago.  
Large majorities favor various confidence-building measures between Iran and the U.S., 
including greater trade, which is more widely supported than a year ago. People-to-people 
confidence-building measures are especially popular. A majority thinks that it is possible for 
Islam and the West to find common ground.  
9. Views of P5+1 Countries (page 30) 
Two thirds say they do not trust the P5+1 countries—however, the minority expressing trust 
has increased since fall 2014. Views of specific countries vary: large majorities have negative 
views of the UK and the U.S.; modest majorities have unfavorable views of Russia and 
France, while views are divided on Germany and China. 
 
10. Views of Regional Actors (page 32) 
A very large majority has an unfavorable view of Saudi Arabia—even slightly more negative 
than views of the U.S. A slight majority now has an unfavorable view of Turkey, which was 
not the case a year ago. Large majorities continue to view Syria and Iraq favorably.  
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1. Iran’s Nuclear Program 
  
Overwhelming majorities of Iranians continue to say that it is very 
important for Iran to have a nuclear program. The nuclear program is seen 
as one of Iran’s greatest achievements. A large majority continues to see the 
program as driven purely by peaceful goals, though one in five see it as 
being an effort to pursue nuclear weapons. This support for Iran’s nuclear 
program appears to be driven by a combination of symbolic and economic 
considerations. However, while a majority sees the program as being an 
important way for Iran to stand up to the West, serving Iran’s future 
energy and medical needs is seen as more important.  
 
 
The consensus among Iranians 
regarding Iran’s nuclear program 
remains stable. Asked, “In your 
opinion, how important is it for our 
country to develop its nuclear 
program?” four in five (83%) called 
it very important and another 11% 
said it was somewhat important.  
Similar questions have been asked 
since 2006 and have consistently 
shown the same high level of support 
(about 8 in 10).   
 
When Iranians are asked in an open-ended question to say in their own words what they think 
has been Iran’s “most important achievement” in recent years, the country’s nuclear program 
is their most common answer. Forty percent cited the nuclear program—far more than talked 
about either advances in medicine, science, or technology (11%) or increases in security and 
military power (12%). Another 11% mentioned economic, cultural, or social progress; 6% 
mentioned Iran’s greater prominence in regional or world affairs. This same question was 
asked by UTCPOR in October 2014, 
and the results were similar—44% 
cited the nuclear program.  
 
A large majority continues to see the 
program as driven purely by peaceful 
goals, though one in five see it as 
being an effort to pursue nuclear 
weapons. Respondents were asked 
whether “Iran’s objective for 
developing nuclear capabilities” is 




as energy or medical needs,” or “is it also seeking to attain the needed capabilities to be able 
to develop nuclear weapons?” Seventy-three percent said they thought the program was 
purely for peaceful purposes; one in five (19%) thought Iran is also seeking a weapons 
capability. In a July 2014 UTCPOR poll, a question that also offered a third option (“Iran is 
pursuing both objectives simultaneously”) got a similar overall result: 69% said the program 
was purely peaceful, while 18% said Iran had both objectives in view (only nuclear weapons: 
4%).  
 
In order to probe further the roots of public support for the nuclear program, respondents were 
asked a series of three questions. First they were asked: “Some say Iran should develop its 
nuclear program because it helps meet Iran's energy and medical needs. How important do 
you think this reason is?” Seven in ten (70%) rated this reason very important.  
 
Next, respondents were offered a different reason for the nuclear program that was grounded 
in defiance of the West: “Some say Iran should develop its nuclear program because it shows 
that Iran will not surrender to Western governments and forego its rights.  How important do 
you think this reason is?” A lesser majority of 60% described this reason as very important. 
 
Finally, respondents were asked: “Of these two reasons, which do you think is more 
important?” A clear majority of 58% chose energy and medical needs, while 38% chose 
demonstrating Iran’s independence.  
 
An open-ended question was used as well asking respondents to say in their own words why 
they believe “that it is important for our country to develop its nuclear program.”  A majority 
(52%) spoke of concrete needs for medical technology and electricity, and to further 
economic development in general. Almost a third (29%) spoke of symbolic reasons including 
raising Iran’s prestige, especially in science and technology; or simply because Iran has the 
right to a nuclear program. The implicitly security related concern to deter other countries 
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2. Views on Nuclear Weapons  
 
A large and growing majority of Iranians express opposition to nuclear 
weapons in various ways. Two thirds now say that producing nuclear 
weapons is contrary to Islam. Eight in ten approve of the NPT goal of 
eliminating nuclear weapons and establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone 
in the Middle East. Consistent with these views, Iranians express opposition 
to chemical weapons, with nine in ten approving of Iran’s decision, during 
the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, to not use chemical weapons in response to 
Iraq’s use of them.  
 
 
Two thirds of the Iranian public (69%) believes that producing nuclear weapons is contrary to 
the principles of Islam, and this majority has grown over the years. When asked, “As far as 
you know, is the production of atomic bombs contrary to the principles of Islam or not?” 69% 
said, “Yes, it is contrary to Islam.” About one in five (22%) said, “No, Islam has not banned 
it.” Fewer than 2% volunteered that Islam has no specific opinion on the subject. Further, 
fully three quarters (75%) say, “Iranian policymakers should take religious teachings into 
account when they make decisions.” 
 
This and similar questions have been 
asked in Iran since 2008, and the 
majorities saying that producing 
nuclear weapons is contrary to Islam 
have risen. In 2008, the majority was 
58% (WorldPublicOpinion.org), and 
as recently as October 2014, it was 
65% (UTCPOR)—slightly below the 
current 69%. Since October, those 
saying Islam has not banned the 
production of nuclear weapons has 
remained low, moving from 25% to 
22%.  
 
A majority of Iranians say they have some knowledge of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT). Fifty-eight percent say they have heard a lot (17%) or some (42%) about the treaty, 
while 39% have not heard much (16%) or are completely unfamiliar with it (23%)—a level of 
awareness unchanged from mid-2014.   
 
More significantly, 81% favor “the goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons, which 
is stated in the…NPT.” This support for the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons has grown 
steadily and consistently over the last decade. In 2006, 68% favored it; in 2008, 72% 
(WorldPublicOpinion.org). In 2014, support reached 74% in July and 76% in October 





Support for the idea of a nuclear 
weapons-free zone in the Middle 
East is also high and on the 
upswing. Told that such a zone 
“would include both Islamic 
countries and Israel,” and would 
require countries not to have 
nuclear weapons, in the current 
poll, 80% favored it (62% strongly), 
with 17% opposed. This is up from 




To probe more deeply into Iranians’ stated opposition to having nuclear weapons, respondents 
were asked to reevaluate Iran’s choice not to use chemical weapons in response to Iraq’s use 
of such weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. Respondents were reminded that:  
 
As you may know, during the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam repeatedly made use of 
chemical weapons against Iran, but Iran decided not to retaliate in kind and thus did 
not use chemical weapons against Iraq.  
 
And asked:  
 
In your opinion, would it have 
been better for Iran to retaliate 
in kind at that time and use 
chemical weapons against 
Iraq, or was Iran's decision not 
to use chemical weapons 
against Iraq a right decision? 
 
A near unanimous 87% endorsed 
Iran’s decision to not reply in kind to Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons. Only 
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3. Iran - P5+1 Nuclear Deal  
 
Given information about the nuclear deal being negotiated between Iran 
and the P5+1, a substantial majority favors it and only one in six oppose it. 
A quarter, though, are undecided or equivocal. Nearly three in four are 
optimistic that Iran and the P5+1 will arrive at a deal in regard to Iran’s 
nuclear program. Three in four think the Majlis (Iran’s Parliament) should 
have a say on a nuclear deal.  
 
 
Respondents were presented key points of the understanding reached in Lausanne, 
Switzerland, before being asked to provide their view. They were first reminded of the 
negotiations and that a preliminary understanding had been reached: 
 
As you may know, Iran and the P5+1 have been negotiating over Iran’s nuclear 
program. Recently they reached an understanding on some of the key terms of a deal, 
though there are still specifics that need to be worked out.  
 
It was clarified to respondents that the points they were about to hear were those that are 
described similarly by all the negotiating parties: 
 
Both sides have made statements regarding the elements of this understanding. In some 
cases, the statements made by both sides were at variance, and each side has rejected 
some of the interpretations of the other side regarding the elements of this 
understanding.    
 
Now, setting aside the statements and the interpretations provided by each side, I would 
like to tell you some important aspects of this understanding that both sides agree on.  
 
Respondents were first told the obligations that Iran would have to fulfill, and then the 
obligations that the P5+1 would have to fulfill. 
 
According to this understanding, Iran will:   
—limit its uranium enrichment to the level needed for the production of nuclear energy 
for a number of years;  
—reduce the number and limit the quality of its operating enrichment centrifuges for a 
number of years;   
—limit its research and development on centrifuges for a number of years;  
—accept more extensive inspections of nuclear sites by the IAEA for an extended 
number of years;  
 
and in return the P5+1 will  
—accept Iran enriching uranium to the limited extent agreed upon for a number of years 




—cooperate with Iran on 
building new nuclear reactors 
and supply Iran with nuclear 
fuel 
—lift economic sanctions on 
Iran 
 
After this information respondents 
were asked: “Now, do you approve 
or disapprove of Iran pursuing a deal 
based on these terms?” A majority 
(57%) approved of Iran pursuing the deal; only 15% disapproved. However, another 17% were 
equivocal, and 11% said they did not know. 
 
Who Favors and Who Opposes a Deal? 
 
There were no significant differences in the level of support for a deal by gender, education, or 
economic status. Also, supporters of pursuing a deal outnumber opponents in virtually all 
demographic groups, and in most attitudinal groups.  
 
Notably, those who think foreign 
sanctions have the greatest negative 
impact on the Iranian economy 
support pursuing a deal at the same 
majority levels as those who think 
domestic economic mismanagement 
and corruption has the greater 
impact. Likewise, those who think 
that if there is no deal, sanctions will 
increase, support pursuing a deal at 
the same majority levels as those 
who think that absent a deal, 
sanctions are likely to gradually weaken. 
 
Support for the deal is more widespread among the young, among internet users, and among 
those who would like to see Rouhani’s supporters make significant gains in the February 2016 
parliamentary elections.  
  
Attitudes about the value of Iran’s nuclear programs are a strong predictor of support.  
Among the majority who said that meeting Iran’s energy and medical needs is the most 
important reason for the nuclear program, 65% approved of pursuing a deal. But among the 
minority who said that the most important reason was to show “that Iran will not surrender to 
Western governments and forego its rights,” less than half (48%) approved of pursuing a deal. 
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Other strong predictors of support 
are the degree of trust in the P5+1 
countries, as well as confidence that 
the P5+1 will follow through on their 
end of the bargain in the event of a 
deal. Those most confident in the 
P5+1 countries on these two 
questions are 24 to 32 points more 
likely to support pursuing a deal.  
 
Most differences between 
demographic groups were small. By 
age, those under 26 were the most supportive group at 64%, compared to 52% of those over 
45 who supported the deal.  Those who use the internet once a week or more were, at 61%, 
more supportive than those who never use the internet (53%).   
 
Among those who want Rouhani’s allies to win the coming parliamentary elections, 62% 
were supportive, while among those who want critics of Rouhani to win, a lesser majority 
(55%) were supportive.   
 
 
Optimism that a Deal Will Be Made  
 
A clear majority of Iranians think that an agreement on the nuclear program agreeable to both 
sides is more likely than not. Asked, “How likely do you think it is that the current talks 
between Iran and the P5+1 countries…will eventually result in a deal that is agreeable to both 
sides?” seven in ten (70%) thought this is likely, though most said “somewhat likely” (49%). 
About a quarter (28%) thought it was not very likely (17%) or not likely at all (11%).  The 
wording of this question is comparable to one asked in Iran by Gallup: “How hopeful are you 
that the current talks…will eventually reach an agreement agreeable to both sides?” which in 
November 2014 found 70% “hopeful” (somewhat hopeful, 48%). 
 
 
Role of the Iranian Parliament 
 
Most Iranians feel that it is 
appropriate for the Iranian 
parliament, the Majlis, to have a role 
in the decision whether or not to 
accept a deal. Three in four (77%) 
said the Majlis should play a role in 
“deciding whether or not our 
country accepts the deal with the 
P5+1 countries over nuclear issues”; 





Asked further about the prospect of the parliament “arriv[ing] at the conclusion that the 
deal…is at odds with our country’s national interests,” four in five (81%) said that in that 
event, the Majlis should be able to prevent such an agreement. It should be noted that the U.S. 
public has generally answered questions about the role of Congress similarly. Such replies are 
partly driven by an understanding that in any constitutional setup, more than one branch of 
government is supposed to be involved in making important decisions in order to build 
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4. The Potential Removal of Sanctions  
 
The support for Iran pursuing a deal with the P5+1 appears to rest to some 
extent on the assumption—held by a large majority—that all sanctions on 
Iran would be lifted as part of the deal, and there is optimism that the 
sanctions would in fact be lifted. Approximately half of respondents say 
Iran should not agree to a deal unless the U.S. lifts all of its sanctions, while 
nearly as many say Iran should be ready to make a deal even if the U.S. 
retains some sanctions, provided all UN and EU sanctions are lifted. Among 
those who believe that all U.S. sanctions would be lifted, support for a deal 
is nearly two thirds, while among those who assume that the U.S. will retain 
some sanctions, support is a bare majority. The removal of UN sanctions is 
seen as more important than the removal of U.S. sanctions.  
 
 
In order to probe for preconceptions in the Iranian public about what would happen if Iran 
makes a deal with the P5+1, respondents were asked for their impressions of what the 
understanding says regarding the future lifting of sanctions on Iran.   
 
Contrary to the U.S. position in the 
negotiations, six in ten (62%) 
respondents said their impression 
was that “all U.S. sanctions on Iran 
are to be lifted eventually.” Only a 
quarter (24%) said, “some U.S. 
sanctions on Iran are to be lifted, but 
many U.S. sanctions are not covered 
by the agreement and will continue.” 
A small minority (9%) had the 
impression that “no U.S. sanctions 
are to be lifted.”   
 
It is noteworthy that respondents’ sources of information have little effect on their perceptions 
of this issue. Those who said that they seek news on the internet daily or at least once a week 
were no more likely to know that only some U.S. sanctions would be lifted than were those 
who watch state television daily.  
 
There is considerable optimism that in the event of an agreement, the P5+1 countries will 
follow through and lift sanctions. Sixty percent thought it very (13%) or somewhat (47%) 
likely that if a deal is reached, “the U.S. will lift sanctions in accordance with the 
requirements of the deal.” A significant minority (37%) disagreed, though only 11% said this 
was “not likely at all.” Expectations that the UN Security Council would follow through were 





Approximately half of respondents say that Iran should not agree to a deal unless the U.S. lifts 
all of its sanctions. Respondents were told: 
 
As you may know, some of the sanctions that the U.S. has imposed on Iran are not 
solely related to the nuclear issue, but related to other issues that the U.S. has with Iran. 
The U.S. says it will lift the nuclear-related sanctions, but it will keep these other 
sanctions in place even if there is a deal.   
 
They were then asked which was closer to their position: 
 
—Unless the U.S. agrees to remove all of its sanctions, Iran should not agree to a deal; 
or 
  
—While Iran should seek to get as many U.S. sanctions lifted as possible, if the UN and 
EU sanctions, and some U.S. sanctions are to be removed, Iran should be ready to make 
a deal. 
 
A bare majority (51%) chose the first, 
more unbending negotiating position; 
but the gap was rather narrow, with 
45% saying Iran should be ready to 
make a deal without complete 
removal of all U.S. sanctions, 
provided that all UN and EU 
sanctions would be lifted. 
 
Assumptions about whether all U.S. 
sanctions would be lifted are highly 
related to support for a deal. Among 
respondents who had the impression that “all sanctions on Iran are to be lifted eventually,” 
approval of pursuing a deal was 64%. Among those who believed, consistent with the U.S. 
position, that not all U.S. sanctions would be lifted, approval was substantially lower at 51%.  
 
Respondents were also asked whether the P5+1 countries have already agreed on the timing to 
start removing broader international 
sanctions in the event of a deal. 
There was no dominant view on this 
question. Thirty-eight percent had 
the impression that the P5+1 have 
agreed to lift all the sanctions 
“immediately”; 29%, that “some 
sanctions would be lifted 
immediately, but the timing for 
others has not been finalized”; and 
27% thought that no schedule has yet 
been agreed upon. 
 




The removal of UN sanctions is seen as more important than the removal of U.S. sanctions.  
Asked “which was of more importance and priority,” a clear majority—59%—said it is more 
important to bring about the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions. Fewer than one in three 







5. Expectations About Positive Effects of a Deal  
Iranians express high expectations that a nuclear deal would result in 
significant positive effects in the near term. Majorities say they would expect 
to see, within a year, better access to foreign medicines and medical 
equipment, significantly more foreign investment, and tangible 
improvement in living standards.  
 
To gain a more concrete picture of Iranian expectations if an agreement is made, respondents 
were asked a series of questions that began: “Assuming that the P5+1 and Iran do come to such 
a deal, I would like to know how long you think it will take before you see certain changes as a 
result of the deal.” They were then asked about possible developments in the economy and in 
their quality of life, and how much time they thought each would take. They were offered four 
options: six months, about a year, about two years, and more than two years. 
A substantial majority—61%—thought they would see Iranians gaining greater access to 
foreign-made medicines and medical equipment in a year or less (six months: 28%). Thirty 
percent thought this would take two years or more. 
A similar number—62%—thought 
they would see “a lot more foreign 
companies making investments in 
Iran” in a year or less (six months: 
32%). Again, 30% thought this would 
take two years or more. 
A slightly lesser 55% thought they 
would see “a tangible improvement in 
people’s standard of living” in a year 
or less (six months: 26%). Over a third 
(37%) thought this would take two 
years or more. 
Hopes were most restrained on the issue of unemployment. Still, 52% thought they would see 
“the unemployment rate going down significantly” in a year or less after a deal (six months: 
22%). Forty percent thought this would take two years or more. 
Rouhani’s supporters tend to have higher expectations about the nuclear deal compared to those 
who are more critical of the president. For instance, of those who want Rouhani’s allies to win 
Majlis seats, two thirds (66%) believe incorrectly that following a deal, all U.S. sanctions are to 
be eventually lifted; among Rouhani’s critics, though, a lesser 54% believe this.   
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As would be expected, attitudes 
about how rapidly a nuclear deal 
would bring about change in Iran 
are strongly related to views about 
pursuing a deal. Those who believe 
that, if a deal occurs, the economic 
improvements in Iran will be swift, 
are more likely to approve of 
pursuing a deal by 23 to 31 points. 
For instance, among those who 
assume that a deal would be 
followed within six months by “a 
lot more foreign companies 
making investments in Iran,” 69% approve, while among those who think this would take 




6. The Sanctions and Iran’s Economy 
  
The sanctions on Iran are overwhelmingly perceived as having a negative 
impact on the country’s economy and on the lives of ordinary people.  
However, views of the economy are fairly sanguine and have been 
improving. Also, the impact of the sanctions is seen as limited and a lesser 




The great majority of Iranians see the nuclear-related sanctions as having hurt their country’s 
economy significantly. Respondents were asked: 
 
As you may know, Iran is currently under sanctions for activities relating to nuclear 
enrichment. In your opinion, to what degree have these sanctions had a negative 
impact on our country's economy? 
 
Seventy-eight percent said the sanctions have had a negative impact (great impact, 41%).  
Only 18% said they have had little (11%) or no (6%) negative impact. When the same 
question was asked in October 2014, responses were nearly identical; earlier, in July 2014, 
they were slightly higher, with 85% seeing a negative impact (great impact, 51%). 
 
An even larger majority see sanctions as having a negative impact on Iranians in their daily 
lives. Eighty-five percent said, “the lives of ordinary people” have felt a great (51%) or some 
(34%) negative impact from the sanctions. Still, this level is down slightly from July 2014, 
when 91% said there has been a negative impact (great impact: 61%). The difference may 
reflect in part the Rouhani administration’s relative success in slowing the rate of inflation. 
 
Iranians’ views of their economy remain—despite their criticisms—more positive than 
negative, and in the last twelve months more have sensed improvement. A modest 54% 
majority called the “country’s general economic situation” somewhat good (43%) or very 
good (11%), while 44% called it bad (very bad, 21%). Asked to assess whether “the economic 
conditions in Iran, as a whole, are getting better or getting worse,” almost half (49%) said they 
were getting better—up from 32% when Gallup asked the same question in May 2014.  In 
the current poll, 37% said conditions were getting worse, down from 46% in Gallup’s May 
2014 poll.  
 
While most Iranians view the international sanctions as a significant hindrance on the 
economy, they do not think sanctions are having a negative impact on the economy that is 
greater negative impact than Iran’s domestic economic mismanagement and corruption. 
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Which of the following do you think has the greatest negative impact on the Iranian 
economy? 
—Foreign sanctions and pressures 
 
—Domestic economic mismanagement and corruption  
 
Nearly two in three (64%) saw 
domestic mismanagement and 
corruption as having the greatest 
negative impact; only 26% thought 
the same of sanctions.  In this 
vein, responding in their own words 
to an open-ended question—“What 
is the most important challenge that 
our country should currently 
address?”—a majority (58%) raised 
domestic issues related to the 
economy: unemployment (33%), 
inflation (11%) and other economic 
problems (15%). Only 9% brought up international sanctions and other foreign pressures. 
 
If the negotiations fail to produce a nuclear deal, Iranians are unsure what would happen next 
with the sanctions. More thought it likely that sanctions on Iran would be increased (38%) 
than thought these sanctions would “gradually weaken” (25%), while a third—32%—thought 






7. Views of Rouhani 
 
As Iran’s parliamentary elections near, Iran’s President Rouhani is clearly 
one of the strongest political figures in Iran. Half would prefer to see 
Rouhani supporters win in the February 2016 parliamentary elections, while 
one quarter favors his critics. However, Rouhani supporters have high 
expectations that a deal removing all U.S. sanctions and bringing rapid 
economic change is going to take place. If a deal is reached that does not 
meet these expectations, Rouhani could be left politically vulnerable. 
 
In a hypothetical presidential match-up, Rouhani currently does better than 
former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by two to one. Large majorities 
say Rouhani has been at least somewhat successful in improving the 
economic situation, improving Iran’s relations with European countries, and 
reducing sanctions. Three in four Iranians say that if the negotiations were 
to fail to produce a final agreement, they would only or mostly blame the 
P5+1 countries.  
 
When Iranians are asked to think ahead to the February 2016 parliamentary elections, they are 
inclined to prefer a strong result for President Rouhani’s supporters by a two-to-one margin. 
Fifty percent said they would “prefer most of the Majlis to be composed of the supporters of 
President Rouhani,” compared to 24% who preferred it to be mostly composed of his critics. 
However, it is important to note that 
those who want Rouhani’s 
supporters to win have significantly 
higher, and in some cases mistaken, 
expectations about the nuclear deal 
compared to those who want 
Rouhani’s critics to 
win—expectations that may be hard 
to fulfill. If these expectations are not 
fulfilled, disappointment would 
likely be greater in Rouhani’s own 
camp than outside it, which could 
create a significant political vulnerability for Rouhani: 
 Of those who want Rouhani’s supporters to win Majlis seats, 42% believe incorrectly 
that the P5+1 has already agreed that in the event of a deal it would lift all of its 
sanctions immediately; of those who want Rouhani’s critics to win, a lesser 31% believe 
this.   
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 Of those who want Rouhani’s supporters to win, two-thirds (66%) believe incorrectly 
that all U.S. sanctions are to be lifted eventually as part of a deal; on the other side, a 
lesser 54% believe this.   
 
 When asked in a series of questions how rapidly they would expect economic changes 
to follow a deal, Rouhani’s supporters were 7-11 points more likely to say “in six 
months” than were those who want his critics to win.   
 
 Further, of those who want Rouhani’s supporters to win, over a third (35%) say they 
would “blame our country’s officials if these negotiations were to fail to produce a 
final agreement” a lot, or somewhat—more than those who want Rouhani’s critics to 
win (20%). 
Despite these risks—and without dominating the political landscape—Rouhani nonetheless 
currently has an unmatched degree of support when compared to potential rivals.  Respondents 
gave spontaneous answers to the question, “If you had to recommend one person as a 
presidential candidate for the 2017 presidential election, who would that person be?” without 
being prompted with names. In this setting, 25% named Rouhani, followed by ex-president 
Ahmadinejad at 9%, Tehran mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf at 6%, ex-president 
Mohammad Khatami at 4%, and ex-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani at 3%.  Seven other 
figures were named, including former challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi, but each by fewer than 
2% of respondents. 
In a follow-on question, Rouhani was matched against the second most-named political figure, 
Ahmadinejad. Voters were asked to assume that “it is now 2017” and that the presidential 
campaign had resolved into a duel between Rouhani and Ahmadinejad. In that hypothetical 
case, 53% said they would vote for Rouhani and only 27% for Ahmadinejad. 
President Rouhani has been in office 
for almost two years and now has a 
record the Iranian public can assess. 
Overall, they seem to regard him as 
having made a good start in many 
areas, without having yet really won 
any laurels. Seven in ten (71%) said 
he has been at least somewhat 
successful in “improving the 
economic situation of our country,” 
though only 15% would say he has 
been very successful; 26% regarded 
him as unsuccessful (very, 9%).  
Iranians were more impressed with 
his record in “improving Iran’s 
relations with European countries,” with 82% calling this successful (very, 30%). In actually 
reducing the sanctions on Iran, 70% felt he has been at least somewhat successful (very, 15%), 
while 25% disagreed.  And on Iran’s security, Rouhani is seen as a good guardian: a striking 




This might be because Iran is situated in a region in turmoil, but has not experienced significant 
attacks on its soil, despite repeated threats from armed extremist groups.  
Iranians are critical of parts of Rouhani’s economic performance, with a majority (53%) saying 
that he has not been successful in reducing unemployment (29% very unsuccessful), while 42% 
gave him some credit for this (very successful, 4%). Sixty-four percent felt he has been at least 
somewhat successful in increasing civil liberties, though only 13% said he has been very 
successful (21% unsuccessful; very, 7%).  
If the nuclear negotiations were to 
fall through, Iranians would not 
blame the Iranian government for the 
failure. Asked who they would 
blame, “if these negotiations were to 
fail to produce a final agreement,” 
three quarters (74%) of respondents 
said they would blame just the P5+1 
(25%), or mostly blame them (49%). 
Only 9% said they would blame only 
Iran (3%) or mostly blame Iran (6%). 
And, though respondents were 
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8. Relations with the U.S.  
 
Views of the United States, especially the U.S. government, continue to be 
quite negative. Only four in ten believe that U.S. leaders genuinely believe 
that Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. Asked why the U.S. is 
imposing sanctions on Iran, the most common answers portray the U.S. as 
seeking to confront and dominate Iran; very few mention concerns about 
nuclear weapons. However, a slight majority has a positive view of the 
American people. 
If Iran and the P5+1 reach a deal, a large majority believes that the U.S. 
will still impede other countries from cooperating with Iran, and a slight 
majority believes that Iran making concessions on the nuclear issue will 
likely lead the U.S. to seek more concessions. Just one in six believe that 
concessions would be likely to lead to greater accommodation; however, 
this number is higher than a year ago.  
Large majorities favor various confidence-building measures between Iran 
and the U.S., including greater trade, which is more widely supported than 
a year ago. People-to-people confidence-building measures are especially 
popular. A majority thinks that it is possible for Islam and the West to find 
common ground.  
 
 
Seventy percent of Iranians have an unfavorable view of the United States, and a majority 
(53%) has very unfavorable views. Twenty-eight percent have a favorable view (very, 8%).  
This is just marginally less negative than in October 2014 (75% unfavorable). 
 
Views of the U.S. government are 
more negative yet, at 86%, 
including three in four Iranians 
(73%) with a very unfavorable 
view. This is virtually identical to 
the same question polled in July 
2014. 
 
Many Iranians question whether 
the ostensible motivations of U.S. 
diplomacy are genuine in regard to 
Iran’s nuclear program. Only four 
in ten Iranians (39%) think that most U.S. leaders believe that Iran is trying to acquire nuclear 
weapons. More (47%) think they do not believe this, with 8% volunteering that U.S. leaders 





So then, what do Iranians think is the primary motive behind U.S. efforts to impose sanctions 
on Iran? In response to an open-ended question, only 16% thought the motive for sanctions 
was to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. The most common answers (49%) 
portrayed the U.S. as seeking to confront and dominate Iran, but in ways that did not refer to 
its nuclear program—rather, to control Iran’s natural resources, constrain its independence 
and efforts to advance, meddle with its political order, and sow dissatisfaction and unrest. 
Another 10% talked about U.S. motives as global and hegemonic, or as focused on the Middle 
Eastern region, without mentioning Iran at all. 
 
It should be noted, though, that Iranians separate this highly negative image of the U.S. 
government from their views of the American people. A 52% majority has a favorable view 
of the American people, while only 42% have an unfavorable view. 
 
Iranians’ negative views of the U.S. government are in evidence when they think about how 
the U.S. would operate after a nuclear agreement was reached. Respondents were asked: 
 
If Iran and the P5+1 do reach a deal, and based on that agreement other countries 
would be permitted to cooperate with Iran on building new nuclear reactors and 
supplying Iran with nuclear fuel, in your opinion is it more likely that the US will 
accept other countries cooperating with Iran in this way or that the US will try to impede 
such cooperation? 
 
A full two-thirds (68%) assumed that the U.S. would obstruct Iran’s other bilateral relations 
(very likely, 32%). Only 28% thought the U.S. would accept this development (very likely, 
7%). 
  
A slight majority (51%) believes that if Iran makes concessions on the nuclear issue, it will 
lead the U.S. to seek more concessions. Iranians were asked a complex question that asked 
them to ponder how the U.S. would respond if it gained some of what it wanted from Iran: 
 
As you may know, our country has many problems and differences with the United 
States, including with respect to the nuclear issue. In your opinion, if Iran were to 
provide concessions on the nuclear issue in return for the lifting of sanctions, is that: 
 
—likely to make the United States more accommodating in other areas of 
contention;  
 
—likely to make the United States rely on pressures and sanctions to extract 
concessions from Iran in other areas as well;  
 
—or is it your opinion that Iran’s concession on the nuclear issue would not 
have much of an effect on other issues between the two countries? 
 
A little over half felt that the likely outcome was that the U.S. would use the same tools as 
before to extract concessions from Iran outside of the nuclear field. Only 18% thought that 
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Iran making concessions would lead the U.S. to be more accommodating. Another 22% 
thought it would make no difference either way. 
 
Compared to when this same question was asked in July 2014, these attitudes have softened. 
The percent of Iranians that believes that the U.S. would likely re-use sanctions in other areas 
has declined from 58% to 51%. The percent that believes it would make no difference to 
relations has gone up from 13% to 22%. The percent that believes the U.S. would likely 
become more accommodating in other areas, though, is statistically unchanged. 
 
Consistent with the majority’s openness toward the American people, large majorities support 
confidence-building steps, especially people-to-people programs, which could increase 
understanding between Iran and the U.S. These questions have been asked since 2006 and 
have shown majority support throughout. Responses in the current study were either distinctly 
higher than in July 2014, or were statistically the same. 
 
 Three-quarters (75%) would support the two governments’ conducting “direct talks on 
issues of mutual concern.” This is up 9 points from 66% support when asked in July 
2014. 
 
 A similar 76% would support greater trade between Iran and the U.S. This is up 7 
points, from 69% in July 2014. 
 
 Four in five (82%) would 
support a program “to have 
more Americans and 
Iranians visit each other’s 
countries as 
tourists”—statistically the 
same as the 80% found in 
July. 
 
 Seventy-eight percent 
would support a program in 
which Iran and the U.S. 
would provide more access 
for each other’s 
journalists—quite similar 
to the 81% found in July.  
 
 Seventy-three percent would support “greater cultural, education, and sporting 






As a broader principle, a majority thinks that it is possible for Islam to find common ground 
with the West, but this majority may be eroding. Respondents were offered a choice between 
two positions about the relations between Islamic civilization and Western civilization: 
 
—Islamic and Western religious and social traditions are incompatible with each 
other, and conflict between the two is inevitable; or 
 
—Most people in the West and the Islamic world have similar needs and wants, so it is 
possible to find common ground. 
 
Respondents were asked which position was closer to their own. A 55% majority chose the 
second position, that it is possible to find common ground. This is down from 58% in July 
2014. About a third (35%) chose the position that conflict is inevitable—up from 30% in July. 
When the same question was asked by WorldPublicOpinion.org in February 2008, 64% 
indicated that it was possible to find common ground, only 12% chose the position that 
conflict is inevitable, and 24% said that they don’t know.  
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9. Views of P5+1 Countries  
 
Two thirds say they do not trust the P5+1 countries—however, the minority 
expressing trust has increased since fall 2014. Views of specific countries 
vary: large majorities have negative views of the UK and the U.S.; modest 
majorities have unfavorable views of Russia and France, while views are 
divided on Germany and China.  
 
 
Although distrust of Iran’s negotiating partners, the P5+1 countries, is still prevalent, there 
has been a shift since October 2014. In October, more than three in five—62%—said that they 
distrusted the P5+1 somewhat (30%) or very much (32%). Attitudes in July 2014 were 
similar. In the current study, though, distrust has moderated somewhat to 57%.  Thirty-nine 
percent said they trust the P5+1 somewhat (33%) or very much (6%)—up 7 points since 
October.  
 
When views of the P5+1 are 
disaggregated and Iranians are 
asked about individual countries, 
signs of a mild thaw appear in 
Iranian attitudes toward some 
countries. Favorable views of the 
United Kingdom—long one of the 
most distrusted nations in the 
Iranian worldview, on a par with the 
U.S.—have crept up from 24% to 
28% since July (unfavorable, 69%; 
very unfavorable, 53%). And as reported in the preceding section, favorable views of the U.S. 
have also increased slightly. 
 
Views of France seem to show this pattern as well. While Iranians remain negative, with 55% 
viewing France unfavorably, this is down 4 points since October. Forty-one percent said they 
view France favorably (very, 10%), up from 37%. 
 
Attitudes toward Germany are now 
divided, after having been negative 
last year.  Forty-nine percent in the 
current study were favorable (14%, 
very) and 48% unfavorable (27%, 
very). Favorable views have risen 5 
points since October. 
 
Attitudes toward China are also 
divided, unchanged since October 




however, tend toward the negative. Forty-eight percent of Iranians view China favorably (9%, 
very) while 48% view China unfavorably (31%, very). The minority that views China very 
unfavorably has grown from 25% to 31% since July 2014.   
 
Views of Russia, interestingly, have turned negative within the last year, and currently 53% 
have an unfavorable view (32%, very), while 43% are positive (10%, very). In both July and 
October 2014, the balance was slightly positive (October: 51% to 47%), but negative views of 
Russia have increased 6 points since October. 
 
The Iranian public’s views of Japan (a country not asked about in earlier polling) are 
unusually sunny. Three in five (61%) look favorably on Japan (25%, very), with 36% looking 
unfavorably (25%, very). 
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10. Views of Regional Actors 
 
A very large majority has an unfavorable view of Saudi Arabia—even 
slightly more negative than views of the U.S. A slight majority now has an 
unfavorable view of Turkey, which was not the case a year ago. Large 
majorities continue to view Syria and Iraq favorably.  
 
 
A 71% majority of respondents have an unfavorable view of Saudi Arabia, and 59% view it 
very unfavorably. This is, strikingly worse than Iranians’ views of the U.S., in that a smaller 
percent (53%) see the U.S. very unfavorably. 
Positive views of Turkey have dropped 9 points since July 2014, from 56% to the current 
45%. Negative views have risen 10 points, from 42% to 52%, and the percent with a very 
unfavorable view of Turkey has grown from 24% to 35%. The different positions the two 
countries hold regarding the Syrian conflict may be partly responsible for this shift. 
Positive views of Syria are held by three in four and are unchanged since July 2014.  
Seventy-seven percent view Syria favorably (31%, very), and only 21% view it unfavorably 
(9%, very). 
Two thirds have a positive attitude toward Iraq, and this view has strengthened slightly.  
Sixty-seven percent have a favorable view of Iraq (33%, very), up from 63% in July, while 
32% have an unfavorable view (17%, very), down from 36% in July. 
